STATE OF TASMANIA v CHRISTOPHER LEE WILLIAM FORD BROWN 2 APRIL 2026
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE SHANAHAN CJ
Christopher Lee William Ford Brown you have pleaded guilty to 20 counts on indictment 320 of 2025, those include counts 1, 3, 9, 14, and 18, being 5 counts of “insertion of false information as data” contrary to s 257E of the Criminal Code 1924, and counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20, being 15 counts of fraud contrary to s 253A of the Criminal Code.
On Monday 22 January 2024, you commenced casual employment as an administration officer with Tasmanian Salmonid Growers Association Ltd, or Salmon Tasmania.
Salmon Tasmania is a not-for-profit organisation and representS three salmon growing industry member organisations; Tassal, Huon Aqua, and Petuna, and perform lobbying, advocacy, and research activities.
In the course of their business at the material time, Salmon Tasmania utilised several different suppliers. When a supplier invoice was received, it was approved for payment by the chief executive officer (‘CEO’) or the technical officer, and was then forwarded to you, as the administration officer, to process.
You were responsible for performing general office administration tasks, including collating and providing copies of supplier invoices to the business’s external bookkeepers, KPMG.
KPMG was tasked with loading the supplier invoice into the business’s software, “Xero”, and generating a banking file which recorded the BSB and bank account number of the supplier, and the amount to be paid. This banking file was then uploaded to Salmon Tasmania’s Westpac online account.
Once this was done, a notification was sent to both the CEO and board chair, who are bank co-signatories for Salmon Tasmania’s Westpac Bank account, advising that a payment was awaiting their authorisation. Two signatories were required to authorise every payment. Once the payment was authorised, you processed the payment from the Westpac Bank account.
You utilised a unique username and password to access Salmon Tasmania’s Westpac online bank account to process all authorised payments, and also to set up profiles, which included the bank account details for the business’s regular payees. When a new payee was created, or the details of an existing payee was changed in Westpac online, you were required to seek approval from one of the bank signatories.
On 31 May 2024, the CEO, Mr Luke Martin, sent a message to you to check in on you, as your behaviour had been out of character. You responded to that message the following day, and told Mr Martin that you were ‘struggling’.
On 3 June 2024, you sent a message to Mr Martin, asking if you could meet. You met three days later on 6 June 2024, at a café in Moonah. You told Mr Martin that you had been dealing with issues, and had been taking money from the business. You were unsure how much money you had taken, but you believed it was about $100,000. You did not disclose how you had taken the money, but mentioned gambling and that you would pay the money back.
Mr Martin immediately reported the matter to KPMG, who undertook an audit of the bank transactions for the January to May 2024 period. The audit revealed that you had created new bank account details in Westpac online for five of the organisation’s suppliers or payees, which were different to the bank account details held by the organisation in “Xero”.
Three of the five suppliers were existing vendors of Salmon Tasmania, and the remaining two were new clients. In each case, you manually created payee details in Westpac online and entered false bank account details, which details were then used to process the payments. These are counts 1, 3, 9, 14, and 18, being the 5 counts relating to the insertion of false information as data contrary to s 257E of the Criminal Code.
In relation to the suppliers relevant to counts 1 and 3, the audit revealed that you did not send KPMG copies of the invoices as you were required to, thereby removing the authentication undertaken by KPMG.
As a result of the audit, your employment was terminated. On 5 July 2024, Luke Martin reported the matter to Tasmania Police.
The police investigation revealed that all of the payments had been directed to five different Commonwealth Bank accounts in your name. Two of those bank accounts were opened by you on the same day within one month of your dishonestly inserting false bank account details in Salmon Tasmania’s Westpac online payee system.
Your dishonest conduct in creating false client bank account records within Salmon Tasmania’s Westpac online system resulted in 15 transactions being authorised for purported payment to the five vendors, but in fact those payments were credited to bank accounts held by you.
As a result of your fraudulent conduct, you obtained a benefit of $221,051.23, over a period of about three months.
On 30 August 2024, you were arrested and taken to the Hobart Police Station. You participated in a record of interview with police, and made full admissions to transferring money from Salmon Tasmania’s bank account to your own personal accounts, and creating new bank account details in their online banking system.
You told police the following. There was no money left, as you had gambled it all. You said that within 20 minutes of the money being transferred to your bank accounts, the money was put into your betting accounts and gambled away. You had always intended to win back and repay what you had taken, but that never eventuated. You had several online betting accounts with Sportsbet, Neds, and Bet365, and had placed bets in person at TAB agencies.
You had opened up a Commonwealth Bank business account in the name of Sam Tasmania, which was similar to Salmon Tasmania, with the intention of using this account to repay the funds you had taken.
You directed the funds to several Commonwealth Bank accounts in an attempt to make your offending less obvious to anyone that looked at the business accounts. You had tried to get the money together to repay the business but when you could not, you decided to inform Luke Martin as to what you had done. At the conclusion of the interview, you were charged and police bailed. You have not spent any time in custody in relation to this matter.
You were committed for trial for first appearance on 29 April 2025. It was then indicated that the matter would resolve on 2 June 2025. The matter has not been prepared for trial.
On 24 June 2024, you told Mr Martin that you were willing to repay the funds and to enter into a repayment plan. At this stage no money has been paid, but I understand that is the subject of discussion with Salmon Tasmania’s insurer, AIG Australia.
Salmon Tasmania’s insurer, AIG Australia, indemnified the loss caused by you. The State makes application pursuant to s 68 of the Sentencing Act 1997 for a compensation order to be made in favour of AIG Australia, for $221,051.23. I now make that order.
You have relevant prior convictions for dishonesty in both Tasmania and New South Wales. The Tasmanian antecedents include that on 24 June 2020, you pleaded guilty to 31 counts of computer related fraud, and one count of stealing, in the Hobart Magistrates Court. The offences occurred over a two‑day period when you stole a credit card and used it to obtain goods and services to the value of approximately nineteen hundred and sixty dollars. You were not convicted but were sentenced to a 50‑hour community correction order in relation to those matters. That was some four years prior to the matters for which I am to sentence you today.
In relation to the New South Wales prior matters, there are three counts of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception. You pleaded guilty to those in the Parramatta Local Court on 25 July 2022. Those crimes occurred when you, in the course of your employment with the Commonwealth Bank, intercepted payments received by Commonwealth Bank customers and then diverted them to your own personal bank accounts. There were 52 transactions totalling $28,919.
In respect of those matters you were convicted and sentenced to a 24‑month community correction order, commencing on 13 December 2022 and concluding on 12 December 2024. That sentence was varied on appeal. Whilst you were originally sentenced to a community correction order requiring you to attend on-going counselling to address issues around mental health and gambling addiction ultimately, following appeal, you were simply required to be of good behaviour. The offences for which I am sentencing you were committed whilst you were subject to that community corrections order.
There is no doubt that you were on notice that you had a problem with a gambling addiction and required assistance with your mental health from the date of your initial conviction for the New South Wales offences on or about 25 July 2022. In terms of your own insight into your conduct it is not to the point that the New South Wales sentence was varied on appeal.
I sought a home detention assessment report which I have received dated 10 February 2026. The report found you were suitable for home detention, suitable for community service, but not suitable for community supervision.
The State submitted that home detention in this circumstance and the circumstances of these crimes is not an appropriate sentence, given the objective seriousness of the offending, and the importance for general and personal deterrence, and the pattern of offending.
Emphasis was placed on your prior convictions for dishonesty matters and your most recent prior convictions occurring in similar circumstances to this. The State emphasised the need for personal deterrence and contended that the imposition of a home detention order would not reflect the seriousness of the offending in this case. I accept the submission that the needs of general and personal deterrence would not be met by a home detention order. In particular the pattern of your offending and failure to seek assistance at an earlier point whilst continuing to offend are primary, but not the only, markers in this respect. I am concerned about your account of earlier sentencing dispositions in your reporting to Community Corrections for the purpose of the home detention assessment report which I will return to below.
Your offending was serious as it involved a significant sum of money. It was a gross breach of trust. It had elements of opportunism about it. It occurred over a short period, however you self-reported your offending.
In mitigation it was emphasised that the 2022 convictions in New South Wales relate to offences committed in 2016. In that sense the pattern of your offending is more discursive than the timing of the previous convictions would suggest. The explanation for why those matters took so long to resolve was that terms of settlement were reached with the Commonwealth Bank, and at the time of settlement they did not report the matter, but those involved in the Banking Royal Commission indicated that the Bank needed to take steps to report those matters.
It was put that the Commonwealth Bank, the complainant in New South Wales, had significant resources to detect this type of fraud and there was nothing sophisticated about your offending by moving monies into an account in your own name. However, whatever the level of sophistication, you were able to offend and you were able to obtain the monies that you did.
In this instance you have self-reported your offending to your employer. I was taken to the judgment of McHugh J in Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, and his reliance on a passage from Street CJ’s reasons in R v Ellis (1986) 6 NSWLR 603 at page 604 to the effect that, “When the conviction follows upon a plea of guilty, that itself is the result of a voluntary disclosure of guilt by the person concerned, a further element of leniency enters into the sentencing decision”. I have taken your self-reporting into account as a separate factor in mitigation.
I was told you suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or “ADHD”. That your ADHD is an executive functioning disability and it results in impulsivity and it means that people, like you, with that condition are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviour, rule-breaking behaviour and the like. It was put on that basis that your ADHD has to be taken into account because it affects your moral culpability.
I enquired what steps you had taken to address your ADHD. I was told that you are receiving treatment in relation to gambling at the Hive, which was formally known as Holyoake. Your initial appointment in respect of that treatment was 12 May 2025 and the last appointment prior to sentencing submissions was 19 February of 2026. It has taken until recently for you to seek treatment for your ADHD. The need for intervention has been obvious for some time.
It was put that an important part of your treatment is that you are now taking a drug known as “Ritalin”. I was told that you cannot believe the impact that that medication has had on your brain and affecting and improving your symptoms, which include emotional dysregulation and impulsivity. I am told your ADHD is a lifelong condition which will always need to be managed.
It was submitted on your behalf that you have now undertaken a self-managed exclusion from gambling nationwide. I was provided with some background information in relation to that exclusion regime.
I sought submissions from your counsel on the need for general and personal deterrence. In that context I asked about the effect of the self-exclusion regime. No information as to the efficacy of such regimes was available, but I have taken those matters into account.
I was provided with a report from Luke Carolan, registered psychologist at “Someone Health” dated 18 February 2026 addressed to the “Presiding Magistrate”. Your first consultation was 13 June 2024. That consultation was soon after you self-reported your offending to your employer. It was put that the report indicates that in terms of your insight, accountability and treatment, that you have found the diagnosis and treatment to be life-changing. Further that the medication you have been prescribed has had a significant impact. The proposed treatment plan attached to that report is directed at your ADHD diagnosis.
It was submitted on your behalf that gambling is a highly addictive activity, and that you are a person who has impaired executive functioning and are particularly vulnerable. It was stated that all your previous offending has been to fund your gambling habit. It has taken you a very long time for you to seek assistance for your ADHD and your obvious gambling addiction. In the interim you have occasioned some significant damage to your employer and its insurer, yours’ is not a victimless crime. Merely because an insurer has born the primary burden of the loss does not change the seriousness of your offending.
I was provided with a document that had some images on it – manage self-exclusion on the first page, and then the second page has “BetStop” at the top. I was also provided with a Hive Counselling attendance report dated 16 April 2025. That report records “Chris engaged with our service for discussions relating to his gambling which he identified as the primary cause of problems in his life”, that your first appointment was 12 May 2025 (about a year after you self-reported), and your last appointment prior to sentencing submissions was 19 February. Again it has taken you some significant time to seek the protection of self-exclusion.
I was provided with a letter from “Varo Medical” which is digitally signed and dated 2 February 2026 from Dr Thomas Toro. I also have a report from “Your Hobart Doctor” dated 11 April 2024, signed by Dr Zhan Ye Chen.
I was told that you have been in paid employment, and that you are working to repay what has been taken. There have been no payments to AIG yet. It was put that this is because AIG have written to you indicating payments should await the outcome of these proceedings.
Your counsel accepted that home detention would be an unusual sentencing outcome for this type of offending. It was submitted that does not mean that such a disposition can be excluded in these circumstances where the cognitive cause or the causal factor leading to your offending, ie attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, is now said to have been treated.
It was put on your behalf that general deterrence and specific deterrence can be met by a home detention order. The basis for that submission was that you have a treatment regime, and a psychologist who opines that your rehabilitation would be better facilitated in the community where you can continue to access your medication regime, and where you can continue with professional care. It was submitted that it is notorious that there is a lack of access to programs in prison.
During sentencing submissions on 20 February 2026 I asked your counsel about access to Ritalin in jail but there was no available information beyond the observation that it is a prescribed medication and being a stimulant based medication there may be some issues with its supply in a correctional setting. I understand that there are developed procedures for administering prescribed medication in Tasmanian correctional facilities.
Ultimately as I was preparing to hand down a sentence in this matter on 24 March 2026 your counsel handed up Hansard for Friday 7 March 2025 in support of the premise that you would be unable to be medicated in the Tasmanian correctional system. Information regarding the availability of Ritalin and other stimulant medication to prisoners should be readily available to a sentencing judge, it should not be necessary to rely upon Parliamentary inquiries. A sentencing judge should not have to resolve the issue as a matter of fact, the answer should be immediately obvious. I adjourned sentencing (again) for further submissions on that matter.
Providing such material at the last minute will always occasion delay in the sentencing process if the proposition for which the material is to be provided needs to be considered or tested.
On close examination the Hansard does not positively establish the principle that someone in your position cannot be medicated with stimulant medication whilst in prison. During the hearing in the Assembly the following observations were made by the Deputy Secretary Corrective Services (p 5):
“We also have a Disability Support Service under our Specialist Support Services that is a new branch that has opened up within our Therapeutic Services Team, That disability team is looking at supporting prisoners with cognitive impairment, ABI or other neurodiverse presentations. At the moment we have a senior psychologist as the team leader in that space. We have two dedicated people working in that space, one a high-needs support counsellor and the other … [a] … senior planning officer, who help to identify and support prisoners that may be presenting with neurodiverse presentations, whether that be ADHD or autism within the prison and trying to really help collaborate with correctional staff on how to support that individual in a custodial environment.”
In the Tasmanian correctional system it appears that the prescription of stimulant medication for ADHD is largely replaced with non-stimulant treatment for ADHD inmates (Manager Crisis Support Services, Tasmanian Prison Services at p 6). That approach is not absolute ( p 7) the Deputy Secretary Corrective Services noted ( p 7):
“In my discussions with doctors here they indicate that if there is a really pressing need to retain someone on stimulant-based medication on a case-by-case basis, then they would give consideration to that. But there general practice, to my understanding, is that they are more likely if someone comes in on stimulant-based medication to try and move them onto a non-stimulant medication and that meets a correctional manager’s needs much better. But if the clinical requirements were that a stimulant medication were to be prescribed they would give consideration to that.”
Of course I am being asked to sentence in a situation where I have little medical evidence regarding the efficacy of non-stimulant medication to deal with your ADHD. In the report from Mr Luke Carolan, registered psychologist, it is noted (un-numbered p 2) that:
“Research also indicates that untreated ADHD is disproportionately represented in correctional populations, and that effective treatment – particularly stimulant medication – substantially reduces impulsivity, aggression and rules breaking behaviour … The Australian ADHD Clinical Practice Guideline notes that ADHD is several times more prevalent in prison than in the general; population and explicitly identifies significant service gaps and unmet need in correctional mental health care, including inconsistent screening and treatment provision. These findings support the clinical view that Mr Brown’s ongoing treatment in the community is likely to yield better long-term outcomes than interruption of care through incarceration.”
I received further submissions from the accused’s counsel today. I have not had the opportunity to engage with those submissions with counsel. I had entertained sentencing submissions on 20 February and 24 March 2026. As I have noted on 24 March 2026, I adjourned sentence despite having prepared my sentencing remarks after a dispute between the parties emerged as to access to stimulant medication in Tasmanian prisons. Providing further submissions at the last minute makes the Court’s task in sentencing that much harder.
I have been provided with excerpts from a 2023 report of the Tasmanian Custodial Inspector. I do not have a copy of that report and it pre-dates the Hansard to which I have referred. I have relied on the Hansard excerpts I have read.
Of course the studies relied upon by Mr Carolan also show that many inmates are being treated in correctional institutions albeit with non-stimulant medication. His report fails to explicitly compare non-stimulant and stimulant based medication regimes, other than to make a general observation about the efficacy of stimulant based medication. That is of little assistance to me in this sentencing exercise.
If I am to take into account your prescription regime then I need some medical evidence to allow me to make an assessment of the impact that has on sentencing, if any. I will not sentence on the basis that you will be un-medicated if sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment. Nor will I sentence on the basis that non-stimulant medication will not be as efficacious as stimulant medication without some substantial and express medical evidence to that effect. There is no evidence that establishes you can not be medicated in custody, albeit likely, at least in the first instance, to be non-stimulant medication. At best, the psychological evidence suggests without explaining why that stimulant medication may be more efficacious.
It was acknowledged by your counsel that a great many cases involving stealing from employer result in an actual term of imprisonment. Albeit, sometimes with suspension of part, or the whole, of a sentence. It was also put that if a sentence of home detention or a suspended sentence lacked immediate or sufficient punitive force, then the addition of community service hours can add punitive force to the sentence.
The home detention assessment report states, “Mr Brown confirmed he works most days between three employers, including his role as a personal trainer, cricket coach and an operator at a production plant, with hours starting as early as 4.45 am through to 7.30 pm Monday to Sunday.” That means that a home detention order which allows you to work across all of those jobs is unlikely to have substantial punitive impact as a sentencing disposition. In that context it was submitted that a lengthy period like 18 months on a home detention order is not insignificant. I have already indicated that I consider that general and specific deterrence requires a disposition other than by way of home detention.
The author of the home detention assessment report considered a significant period of community service such as 175 hours or greater.
In that context it was put on your behalf that the best chance for addressing your ADHD and the treatment that you need is that you remain in the community in a setting such as home detention, and that it is fundamentally more difficult to obtain the right treatment for ADHD in the prison setting.
Turning to the application of the Verdins principles. That is a reference to the six principle referred to in R v Verdins, Buckley and Vo [2007] VSCA 102, 16 VR 269 (“Verdins”). at 276, [32]. The first step is to recognise the mental health issues raised in this case. Mr Luke Carolan (un-numbered p 2 of his report dated 18 February 2026) describes your co-morbid disorders in the following terms, “Mr Brown meets the criteria for major depression and generalised anxiety disorder, however it must be noted that these diagnoses are most likely secondary symptoms with ADHD being the most relevant factor”.
The first Verdins principle is that where impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent, could reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances, and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective. In this instance I am prepared to accept that your ADHD enlivens this first principle to some degree. However, the extent to which your moral culpability is lessened is not the same as a person who is undiagnosed and unaware of his or her impaired mental functioning. You were neither stupid nor unaware. You were previously charged with similar offending in Tasmania and New Soth Wales and convicted in New South Wales. Sentencing in New South Wales prior to your offending on this occasion clearly included a discussion about the need for mental health review and the need to address your gambling addiction. You have been slow to act upon the obvious need for medical and other assistance, and even after those earlier convictions you continued to accept employment which gave you access to opportunities to defraud your employer. It is also clear that many people with ADHD are able to manage their health issues without offending, albeit I recognise that is harder when undiagnosed, but merely because one is undiagnosed with ADHD does not make criminal offending inevitable.. For example, there are basic steps that can be taken around self-exclusion even when someone has undiagnosed ADHD.
Turning to the second principle, it is hard to assess exactly how your mental health might impact on an appropriate sentence. I have canvassed the issues in respect of the comparison between stimulant or non-stimulant medication. I note that a period of imprisonment may interrupt existing therapeutic support, however that is not infrequently the case when offenders are sentenced to a period of imprisonment. I have however taken those matters into account in arriving at the sentencing disposition in this matter.
The third principle is the proposition that the need for general deterrence may be reduced if an offender’s mental impairment limits his or her understanding or control over their actions. Equally, the fourth principle goes to the issue of specific deterrence, that is, whether the need to deter the individual from future offending may be less significant if their mental functioning was impaired. In this instance I have been provided with evidence that indicates that commencing ADHD medication is associated with a measurable reduction in criminal offending. I accept that ADHD, and your impulsivity, aggression and rule breaking behaviours, have contributed to your offending. Whilst medication to treat ADHD may reduce the risk of re-offending it does not eliminate it. In this instance you had substantial warnings of the need to seek assistance. I have, however taken these matters into account in sentencing you on this occasion.
In respect of the fifth and sixth factors, they address the possibility that a sentence of imprisonment may weigh more heavily on you because of your ADHD, and the prospect that imprisonment may significantly harm your mental health. I accept that the regime in prison may make stimulant medication for ADHD harder to access but it is unclear to me that will result in imprisonment weighing more heavily on you than on others. Equally, whilst imprisonment may result in an interruption to your therapeutic treatment for ADHD it is also unclear how that may significantly harm your mental health.
I make those observations because of the lack of significant expert opinion as to a comparison between stimulant and non-stimulant based medication for the treatment of ADHD.
Christopher Lee William Ford Brown, you are convicted on all 20 counts on the indictment. Your offending has been committed within a short period but was a gross breach of trust and involved a total amount of $221,051.23. The money was used to feed your then long-standing gambling habit. You have prior convictions for very similar behaviour which I have described above. You self-reported your offending and made an early plea of guilty and I have taken those matters into account.
Your counsel made repeated, strenuous and lengthy submissions on your behalf that you be the subject of a home detention order, largely on the basis that having been prescribed Ritalin, a stimulant medication, for your ADHD and, being employed, the best course was to leave you in the community subject to community service requirements. The State says that your offending is too serious for such a disposition and the demands of general and specific deterrence must be served.
Of course those are propositions to which the third and fourth limbs of Verdins are relevant, but in the end after lengthy and careful consideration I have accepted the State’s submission in that regard, especially in light of your reported observations to the author of the home detention assessment report at page 3 where it was said, “Mr Brown attributed the index offending to his gambling addiction, poor decision-making and minimal previous repercussions for his actions.” I am particularly concerned about the latter observation regarding “minimal previous repercussions” for your actions which suggests a continuing need for specific deterrence.
A term of immediate imprisonment is necessary to express the need for general and specific deterrence in respect of the sheer scale of your offending and in the context of earlier convictions for the same type of offending. But for your self-reporting, plea of guilty and the Verdins factors I have referred to, I would have sentenced you to a term of at least three years imprisonment and would have had to reconsider what portion, if any, of that sentence should be suspended.
In your circumstances I impose a single sentence. I sentence you to two years imprisonment to commence immediately, the execution of 12 months of which is suspended on the condition that you commit no offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of 18 months from your release. That means you will serve 12 months of that sentence. In that regard I make you eligible for parole after serving half of that sentence. The non-parole period will be half In imposing that sentence and suspending 12 months of the head term I have specifically taken into account your self-reporting, your plea of guilty, the impact of your ADHD in the context of the Verdins principles and any difficulties you may have accessing stimulant medication in the custodial system.
I also make the order suspending 12 months of your sentence subject to the supervision of a probation officer under s 24(2) of the Sentencing Act in which regard I make the following community corrections order. In doing so I note that the author of the home detention assessment report recommended against a community supervision order, but in this instance it is essential that you be supervised whilst in the community. The conditions I impose in respect of that order reflect the recommended conditions set out in the report.
I make a community corrections order under s 42AN of the Sentencing Act to commence on your release, and operate for a period 12 months. That order will include all the core conditions under s 42AO of the Sentencing Act and the following conditions will also apply:
- You must, during the operational period of the order, submit to the supervision of a probation officer as required by the probation officer;
- You must, during the operation period of this order, maintain in operating condition an active mobile phone service, provide the contact details to Community Corrections and be accessible for contact through this device at all times;
- You must not, during the operational period of the order, take any illicit or prohibited substances. Illicit and prohibited substances include:
- any controlled drug as defined by the Misuse of Drugs Act 2001;
- any medication containing an opiate, benzodiazepine, bupropion, hydrochloride or pseudoephedrine, unless you provide written evidence from your medical professional that you have been prescribed the relevant medication;
- You must not, during the operational period of the order, consume alcohol, and you must if directed to do so by a police officer or community corrections officer, submit to a breath test, urine test or other test for the presence of alcohol;
- Accept referral by a probation officer to a qualified gambling counsellor and participate, with the counsellor’s assistance, in the self-exclusion process of the Tasmanian Gambling Exclusion Scheme including self-exclusion from internet based gambling;
- You must within 7 days of your release arrange and maintain a current exclusion under the Tasmanian Gambling Exclusion Scheme for all local gambling venues for the duration of the order, and must provide proof of the exclusion to Community Corrections, and
- You must, during the operational period of the order, submit to medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer.
You must attend the Community Corrections office at Hobart for induction into this order. You must attend that service for induction during business hours and no later than 10:00 am on the first business day following your release.
The effect of the order under s 24(2) of the Sentencing Act is that the community corrections order works as a condition upon which the suspension of your sentence rests. If you breach those conditions you may be brought back to the Court for re-sentencing and required to serve the balance of the term of imprisonment imposed today. By making those orders under s 24(2) I further acknowledge the seriousness of your offending.
I make a compensation order pursuant to s 68 of the Sentencing Act in favour of AIG Australia, for $221,051.23.
It is to be hoped that your diagnosis and medication for ADHD represents a turning point in your life. Of course whether it does or not is a matter for you.